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COMMENTS
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ORDERS ELIMINATION OF THE "NEGATIVE" ORDER DocTRINE - The recent
decision of the Supreme Court in Rochester Telephone Corporation v.
United States 1 is of importance in determining the reviewability of
administrative orders that are negative in character. In the principal
case, under authority of the Federal Communications Act 2 the Federal
Communications Commission issued a general order directing that
every telephone carrier file statements concerning its business and
affairs. The Rochester Telephone Corporation, the petitioner, failed to
file such statements, claiming it was not subject to the commission's
jurisdiction because of an exemption under section 2 (b) ( 2) of the
Communications Act of 1934. This section provides that the commission
shall not have jurisdiction over any carrier "engaged in interstate or
foreign communication solely through physical connection with the
facilities of another carrier not directly or indirectly controlling or
controlled by, or under direct or indirect common control with, such
carrier." Upon subsequent hearing before the commission, to show cause
why the carrier had not filed the necessary reports, it was decided that
the telephone company was subject to the act because under the "control" of the New York Telephone Company, for the New York Company by stock holdings exercised substantial operating control over the
petitioner. The result of this decision was to decide its "status" as to
the act and to subject the petitioner to the earlier general order, requiring all telephone carriers to file statements of their business and affairs.
From such order the carrier sought judicial review. In granting review
of the commission's order which had denied affirmative relief, the
Supreme Court expressly overruled the "negative" order doctrine. It
is this doctrine, its operation, and the effects of its elimination which the
following comment examines.
1 307 U. S. 125, 59 S. Ct. 754 (1939), affirming (D. C. N. Y. 1938) 23 F.
Supp. 634. See comment, 24 MINN. L. REv. 379 (1940) and McAllister, "Statutory
Roads to Review of Federal Administrative Orders," 28 CAL. L. REv. 129 (1940).
2 48 Stat. L. 1077 (1934), 47 U.S. C. (1934), § 219.
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I.

Since the ascendancy of federal regulatory agencies in our governmental system, no single, clearly defined rule has governed the action
of the judiciary in reviewing administrative orders. Inasmuch as statutory provisions have normally indicated but vaguely the kind of orders
which may be reviewed and the extent of such review, the courts have
had unrestrained discretion in placing limitations on reviewability.3
The manifest course of the judiciary has been to restrict the field of
reviewable orders, oftentimes imposing a real hardship on petitioners
seeking review.4 The purposes served by the practice of non-reviewability were indisputable. Preliminary issues and problems were
eliminated by administrative action, and final consideration by the administrative commission restricted and more precisely defined the questions that the court must consider.5 Furthermore, in many instances, to
broaden the review would have destroyed the peculiar benefit gained
from administrative function because of the administrative proficiency
with respect to technical questions involved. 0 In addition, to forestall
premature attempts at judicial review, the courts espoused the doctrine
of primary jurisdiction, believing that such restriction would perpetuate
the federal agencies' dominant control over policies involved, and likewise insure uniformity of result. 7 Thus, whenever an administrative
inquiry necessitated the exercise of administrative discretion, the principle of primary jurisdiction was invoked to secure precedence of
administrative action. To further restrict the scope of reviewability, the
principle of administrative finality was evoked, giving administrative
8 McDermott, "To What Extent Should the Decisions of Administrative Bodies
Be Reviewable by the Courts," 25 A. B. A. J. 453 (1939); Davison, "Administration and Judicial Self-Limitation," 4 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 291 (1936); 2 SHARFMAN, THE INTERSTATE CoMMERCE COMMISSION 385 (1931); McFARLAND, JumcIAL
CoNTROL OF THE FEDERAL TRADE CoMMiss10N AND THE INTERSTATE CoMMERCE
CoMMiss10N 1920-1930, p. 138 (1933).
4 D1CKINSON, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAW 71 (1927);
48 YALE L. J. 1257 (1939).
15 United States v. Los Angeles & S. L. R. R., 273 U. S. 299, 47 S. Ct. 413
(1927}; United States v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 226, 58 S. Ct. 601 (1937); 47 YALE
L. J. 766 (1937); 48 YALE L. J. 1257 (1939).
6 2 SHARFMAN, THE INTERSTATE.COMMERCE CoMMISSION 390 (1931); LANDIS,
THE ADMINISTRATIVE PRocEss 141 (1938). Thus, preliminary procedural orders and
final orders of administrative agencies which are merely findings of fact or valuations
would generally not be reviewable. Delaware & Hudson Co. v. United States, 266
U.S. 438, 45 S. Ct. 153 (1924); Federal Power Commission v. Metropolitan Edison
Co., 304 U.S. 375, 58 S. Ct. 963 (1938).
7 The doctrine of primary jurisdiction was first invoked in Texas & Pac. Ry. v.
Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U. S. 426, 27 S. Ct. 350 (1907). This doctrine was
intended to estabfoh only priority of administrative jurisdiction, but the actual working
of the rule has made many administrative findings and orders final.
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officers wide latitude to determine conclusively certain matters of fact
brought before them.
With the growing demand for judicial review due to the increased
number of administrative orders under the Interstate Commerce Act,
the Supreme Court of the United States expounded the "affirmative"
and "negative" order doctrine, limiting review to only those orders
which demanded or directed that a particular thing be done. 8 In so
refusing judicial review of certain "negative" administrative orders,
the consideration guiding the Supreme Court was that the tribunal
had denied affirmative relief and not that the tribunal's order was
negative in character. 9 The application of this doctrine was considered
by many to be a questionable narrowing of the area of judicial interference.10 It was a restrictive interpretation of the statutory right of
review. As a result, various efforts were made to obtain judicial review
in a manner other than by statutory appeal or statutory injunction, but
generally to no avail.11 However, when the orders were "permissive,"
strangely enough the Court generally granted review without application of the "negative" order doctrine. 12 Although the doctrine was
originally confined to the decisions of the Interstate Commerce Com8 Proctor & Gamble Co. v. United States, 225 U.S. 282, 32 S. Ct. 761 (1912).
The opinion in the Proctor case rested on two grounds: ( l) the exercise of powers
of review over negative orders was declared to be inconsistent with th~ entire system
of administrative control set up by the act to regulate commerce; (2) the Court interpreted the statute creating the Commerce Court, and concluded it showed a legislative
intent to limit review to affirmative orders only.
9 Chicago Junction Case, 264 U.S. 258 at 264, 44 S. Ct. 317 (1924), where the
Court said: "In Proctor & Gamble v. United States, 225 U. S. 282 [32 S. Ct. 761
(1912)]; Hooker v. Knapp, 225 U. S. 302 [32 S. Ct. 769 (1912)]; and Lehigh
Valley R.R. Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 412 [37 S. Ct. 397 (1917)], judicial
review was refused, not because the order was permissive, or because it was negative in
character, but because it was a denial of the affirmative relief sought."
10 In order to obtain judicial r71ief from the administrative agency's order, the
Urgent Deficiencies Act provided for alternative statutory relief, either by direct appeal
or by use of statutory injunctive relief. 38 Stat. L. 219 (1913), 28 U.S. C. (1934),
§ 41 (28). In providing for these alternative reliefs from administrative orders, the
statute did not in express language provide that judicial review should be limited to
"affirmative" orders.
11 Injunction: Sykes v. Jenny Wren Co., (App. D. C. 1935) 78 F. (2d) 729;
certiorari: Chamber of Commerce of Minneapolis v. Federal Trade Commission,
(C. C. A. 8th, l 922) 280 F. 45; mandamus: Interstate Commerce Commission v.
United States ex rel. Campbell, 289 U. S. 385, 53 S. Ct. 607 (1933); prohibition:
United States v. Interstate Commerce Commission, (App. D. C. 1931) 51 F. (2d)
429; quia timet: White v. Johnson, 282 U.S. 367, 51 S. Ct. II5 (1931); declaratory
judgment: Piedmont & Northern Ry. v. United States, 280 U. S. 469, 50 S. Ct.
192 (1930).
.
12 Chicago Junction Case, 264 U.S. 258, 44 S. Ct. 317 (1924); Colorado v.
United States, 271 U. S. 153, 46 S. Ct. 452 (1926); 34 CoL. L. REV. 908 at 909·
(1934).
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mission, later decisions applied it to other federal agencies whose decisions were subject to similar types of review. 13 The negative order
doctrine had the further consequence of inducing the courts to deny
review of interlocutory orders.14 By application of similar technique
and reasoning, the courts held that a "finding'' or "decision" of an
administrative commission was not an order within the statute because
it did not command or direct a particular thing to be done; therefore
it was non-reviewable. 15 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court soon departed from the rigour of its original rule, and held that an order
negative in form would be reviewable if affirmative in substance.16 In
more recent decisions the Court has even granted independent equitable
relief, although the statutory methods of judicial review were intended
to be exclusive.17 In fact, in a few instances independent equitable relief
has been granted on the ground that property rights have been jeopard13

Decision of the secretary of agriculture under the Packers and Stockyards Act
[42 Stat. L. 168 (1921), 7 U.S. C. (1934), § 217] in United States v. Corrick,
298 U.S. 435, 56 S. Ct. 829 (1936); decision of the Federal Communications Commission under the Communications Act [48 Stat. L. 1093 (1934), as amended by 50
Stat. L. 197 (1937), 47 U.S. C. (Supp. 1938), § 402 (a)] in American Tel. & Tel.
Co. v. United States, (D. C. N. Y. 1936) 14 F. Supp. 121.
14 An "order" assigning a cause for further hearing was held not reviewable,
although the defendant railroad denied the tribunal's jurisdiction. United States
v. Illinois Central R. R., 244 U. S. 82, 37 S. Ct. 5841 (1917). "Order" denying
motion to dismiss a proceeding before hearing was held not reviewable. Chamber of
Commerce of Minneapolis v. Federal Trade Commission, (C. C. A. 8th, 1922) 280
F. 45.
15
ln American Federation of Labor v. National Labor Relations Board, (App.
D. C. 1939) 103 F. (2d) 933, the board's decision had determined that the employer unit for purposes of representation should embrace the entire West Coast, and
that the C. I. 0. should be the exclusive bargaining agent. From this determination the
A. F. of L. appealed, but the court refused to give review because the "decision" of
the board was not an "order" since there was no affirmative command. See also, Carolina
Aluminum Co. v. Federal Power Commission, (C. C. A. 4th, 1938} 97 F. (2d)
435, where the court held that a "finding" of the Federal Power Commission that
interstate or foreign commerce would be affected by the proposed construction of a
hydro-electric plant by the petitioner was not an "order" within the terms of the
statute.
16
Thus the propriety of the commission's action in denying departure from the
long and short haul clause was held reviewable because the commission's failure to
take jurisdiction was affirmative in substance and such action refused an affirmative
right of judicial review given by the statute when certain conditions existed. Intermountain Rate Cases, 234 U.S. 476, 34 S. Ct. 986 (1914). Similarly, an order of the
commission dealing with apportionment of coal cars in time of shortage, which in form
dismissed a complaint of shippers, but in effect required the observance of a particular
car-distribution rule had been held affirmative in substance and thus reviewable. United
States v. New River Co., 265 U.S. 533, 44 S. Ct. 610 (1924). See also, Alton Ry.
v. United States, 287 U.S. 229, 53 S. Ct. 124 (1932).
17
47 YALE L. J. 766 (1938).
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ized, or that the complainant has been compelled to disclose confidential
information.18 These opinions are subject to the criticism that they
allow administrative orders to be reviewed by single judge district
courts, whereas the statute calls for appellate review either by circuit
courts of appeals or by "three-judge courts" in some circumstances.1 g
Furthermore, to concede such equitable jurisdiction in federal district
courts is undesirable, since it results in greater delay in the appeal
process; and generally the expertness of a single judge on an administrative problem is not comparable to that of judges on the circuit court
of appeals or three-judge courts set up under the statutory proceeding.
There has been no real need for the negative order doctrine, since
the supremacy of administrative methoq. could be effectively maintained
through the requirement of preliminary resort to the administrative
agency. Furthermore, there has been as great a need for judicial review
of administrative orders denying affirmative relief as there was for those
which granted affirmative relief. If judicial review is granted, it is not
an infringement on legitimate administrative discretion, but only a
check on its ultra vires acts and those amounting to an abuse of discretion. 20 Recently, with the increasing importance and growth of administrative agencies, resulting in increased attempts at judicial review, there
has'been an indication that the negative order doctrine has operated only
to preclude attacks by statutory injunction and not to prevent independent equitable relief from negative orders. 21 However, the most recent
decision of the Supreme Court completely discards the negative order
doctrine as a restriction upon judicial review on the ground that "The
considerations of policy for which the notions of 'negative' orders and
'affirmative' orders were introduced, are completely satisfied by application of the combined doctrines of primary jurisdiction and administrative finality." 22 Since the Rochester decision sets up new criteria for

1

18 In American Sumatra Tobacco Corp. v. Securities and Exchange Commission,
(App. D. C. 1937) 93 F. (2d) 236, independent equitable relief was granted since
the property rights of the complainant were supposedly being jeopardized. See also,
Utah Fuel Co. v. National Bituminous Coal Commission, 306 U. S. 56, 59 S. Ct.
409 (1939), where the complainant fuel company was granted relief in equity, independent of the statutory method, against the threatened disclosure by the commission
of cc;mfidential information.
19 48 YALE L. J. 1257 at 1259 (1939).
20 2 SHARFMAN, THE INTERSTATE CoMMERCE CoMMISSION 416 (1931). Assuming
the courts grant judicial review, that review is limited. However, there has been a
recent tendency to broaden the scope of such review. 50 HARV. L. REv. 78 (1936).
21 United States v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 226, 59 S. Ct. 601 (1937); 47 YALE
L. J. 766 (1938).
22 Rochester Telephone Corp. v. United States, 307 U. S. 125 at 142, 59 S. Ct.
z54 (1939). Frankfurter, J., in delivering the majority opinion of the Court said
further (307 U. S. at 143): "any distinction, as such, between 'negative' and 'affirmative' orders, as a touchstone of jurisdiction to review the Commission's orders, serves
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testing the reviewability of administrative orders, it will be expedient
to view the decision in detail. 23
2.

The opinion first affirms the doctrine of primary jurisdiction and
the necessity of full resort to the administrative process as prerequisites
to petitioning for judicial review. The party seeking review must further satisfy three general requirements: existence of a "case" or "controversy," certain conventional requisites of equitable jurisdiction, and
finally a right to review within the specific terms of the Urgent Deficiencies Act. 24 No general classification of reviewable orders is set out,
but the Court indicates three general categories into which prior decisions under the negative order doctrine fell. 25 The first group included those orders which would have the effect of forbidding or compelling conduct only on the contingency of some further action by the
commission and thus non-reviewable. 20 Under the new definition of
reviewable orders, the first group would still not be reviewable because
there would be no "case" or "controversy"; furthermore, the decisions
in this group consist largely of orders which are interlocutory steps in
the administrative proceeding which are never reviewable. The second
group includes those orders "where the action sought to be reviewed
declines to relieve the complainant from a statutory command forbidding or compelling conduct on his part." 21 Here, under the new defino useful purpose, and insofar as earlier decisions have been controlled by this distinction, they can no longer be guiding."
28 Of course the elimination of the negative order doctrine necessarily means a
broadening of the field of judicial review, and presupposes the wisdom of such review.
Keller, "Judicial Control and the Communications Commission," 25 GEORGETOWN
L. J. 930 (1937). Some authorities have denied the need for judicial review of
administrative orders. A third group has advanced the feasibility of an autonomous
administrative justice with a special administrative judiciary set up to review administrative orders, Cooper, "Administrative Justice and the Role of Discretion," 47 YALE
L. J. 577 (1938).
24 38 Stat. L. 219 (1913), incorporated in the Federal Communications Act, 48
Stat. L. 1093 (1934), 47 U.S. C. (Supp. 1938), § 402(a).
25 Rochester Telephone Corp. v. United States, 307 U. 5. 125 at 129-130,
59S. Ct. 754 (1939).
26 Thus the following orders would not be reviewable: tentative valuation: Delaware & Hudson Co. v. United States, 266 U. S. 438, 45 S. Ct. 153 (1924); final
valuation allegedly inaccurate: United States v. Los Angeles & S. L. R. R., 273 U. S.
299, 47 S. Ct. 413 (1927); finding that a carrier is within the Railway Labor Act
and thus amenable to the National Mediation Board: Shannahan v. United States,
303 U. S. 596, 58 S. Ct. 732 (1938).
27 Rochester Telephone Corp. v. United States, 307 U.S. 125 at 129, 59 S. Ct.
754 (1939). Denial of the application of the carrier for a continuance of common
control of rail and water lines was held not reviewable by the court. Lehigh Valley
R.R. v. United States, 243 U. S. 412, 37 £. Ct. 397 (1917). An order of the com-
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nition, judicial review will be allowed, although it would not have been
allowed under the negative order concept. The facts of the principal
case bring it within this group, for the order of the Federal Communications Commission involved in this case determined the "status" of the
telephone company as one engaged in interstate commerce through
physical connection with the facilities of another carrier controlling
it, and thus the company was bound by earlier general orders requiring
all telephone carriers to file schedules of charges, copies of contracts,
and other information. 28 In holding that the question of "status" was a
reviewable one, the Rochester case overrules prior decisions which
refused to decide or review the administrative finding in regard to
"status." The third group of formerly non-reviewable orders consists
of administrative decisions that fail to forbid or compel conduct by a
third party. By placing this group within the field of reviewable orders,
the Court expressly overrules Proctor & Gamble v. United States.29
As the decision sets up general standards which may be liberally or
strictly construed in granting judicial review, it is difficult to evaluate
its results. For instance, one of the essential requirements for review is
that there be a "case" or "controversy." 30 It remains possible for the
Court, in order to limit judicial review, to adopt a narrow construction of the terms "case" or "controversy." 31 Furthermore, the requirements of the Urgent Deficiencies Act must still be satisfied; namely,
that the suit be one "to enjoin, set aside, annul, or suspend" an "order
of the •.. commission." 32 Here, again, the word "order" is peculiarly
mission deRying a certificate to extend line was held not reviewable in Piedmont &
Northern Ry. v. United States, 280 U. S. 469, 50 S. Ct. 192 (1930).
28 Butler, J., dissenting in the principal case, 307 U. S. at 147, said that the
final order of the commission was more than a determination of the "status" of the
complainant telephone company, since the order subjected the ,party to .the earlier
affirmative general orders of the commission, and thus was reviewable because affirmative in substance. The fallacy of this reasoning was that review was denied on practically similar facts in Piedmont & Northern Ry. v. United States, 280 U. S. 469,
50 S. Ct. 192 (1930).
29 225 U.S. 282, 32 S. Ct. 761 (1912). This was the first decision to espouse
the negative order doctrine. Here an order which denied recovery of demurrage from
certain railroads and which refused to set aside administrative rules allowing demurrage
charges was held non-reviewable. However, if the commission had ruled for the shipper
in the Proctor case, the railway could have had judicial review. 87 Umv. PA. L. REv.
IOIO (1939); 47 YALE L. J. 766 (1938).
30 The following elements are necessary to make up a justiciable controversy:
adversary parties with a plaintiff and defendant adequately interested, and personal or
property rights, private or public, which would be definitely affected. Muskrat v.
United States, 219 U.S. 346, 31 S. Ct. 250 (19n).
31 In the declaratory judgment field this narrow interpretation of the words
"case" and "controversy" has been particularly evident. Borchard, "Justiciability,"
4 Umv. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1936).
82 38 Stat. L. 219 (1913), 28 U.S. C. (1934), § 46.
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susceptible to judicial interpretation. There have been cases outside
the field of the negative order concept, where it has been held that a
"decision" or "finding," though final, was not reviewable because it
was not an order.83 Thus, by the application of this line of authority,
it still remains possible to use the reasoning of the negative order
doctrine to prevent a judicial review of administrative orders negative
in character; for this reason it is possible that the principal decision may
not completely dispel the possibility of future application of negative
order reasoning. However, the opinion is desirable in that it discards a
concept which confused the category of reviewable orders, and further
it escapes the confinement of rigidly grouping reviewable and nonreviewable orders. Moreover, since the expediency of giving judicial
review of administrative orders varies with each specific problem, the
guides for reviewability in the principal decision are sufficiently :flexible
to cope with the ever-changing demand for review by the courts. In this
respect the Rochester opinion represents a desirable departure from
the strictures of the negative and affirmative order tests of reviewability.
Robert J. Miller

83 33 ILL. L. REv. 852 (1939); Carolina Aluminum Co. v. Federal Power
Commission, (C. C. A. 4th, 1938) 97 F. (2d) 435; American Federation of Labor
v. National Labor Relations Board, (App. D. C. 1939) 103 F. (2d) 933.

